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Models of scientific community:
Charles Sanders Peirce to Thomas Kuhn
STRUAN JACOBS
School of History, Heritage and Society, Deakin University, Geelong, Victoria 3217, Australia
‘Scientific community’ is common currency in the study of science, largely due to Kuhn’s
use of the term in his highly influential book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. As this
article explains, however, ‘scientific community’ was not of Kuhn’s coining. It was hinted
at by Peirce, and expressly designated by Royce. On a few occasions Fleck affirmed a
scientific community, while Polanyi studied it in some detail. The article concludes by
comparing these thinkers’ ‘communitarian’ interpretations of science.
Until the 1960s, most theorists of scientific method and knowledge focused on scientists
as individual agents. Gunther Stent described this as the ‘Robinson Crusoe’ image of
science.1 The image is apparent in the writings of René Descartes and John Locke in the
seventeenth century, Joseph Priestley and David Hume in the eighteenth, John Herschel
and John Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century, and the likes of Alfred Ayer, Rudolf
Carnap, Carl Hempel and Hans Reichenbach in the twentieth. Beginning with Francis
Bacon in the seventeenth century, however, certain theorists of science have indicated the
importance of its social dimension.
The American philosopher Josiah Royce may well have been the first scholar to
explicitly discuss the ‘scientific community’, and this term, or else the idea, appeared in the
writings of at least two other scholars in the first half of the twentieth century. Thomas
Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) has had a major impact on the history,
philosophy and sociology of science, and its theme of scientific community is testimony
of this. Since the publication of Kuhn’s book, the idea of scientific community has been
extensively used by writers on science. A study in the history of ideas, the present article
presents certain important theories of scientific community, or of social objects that
resemble scientific communities: the theories of Charles Sanders Peirce, Royce, Ludwik
Fleck, Michael Polanyi and Kuhn.
THOMAS KUHN: SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITIES AND PARADIGMS
Kuhn (1922–96) is considered by many scholars to have transformed the understanding
of science, his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions demolishing a number of received ideas
about the natural sciences (e.g. comparison of theories’ predictive successes as the basis of
rational theory-choice; successive theories as contributing to the forward advance of scien-
tific knowledge) and replacing them with ideas of a different complexion (e.g. theoretical
frameworks as ‘incommensurable’). Kuhn assigns to the concept of scientific community
a prominent role in his theory, pairing it with the notion of ‘paradigm’. Each Kuhnian
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scientific community exists because a group of scientists is agreed on accepting one
paradigm. A paradigm is, in Kuhn’s account, a complex entity, consisting in a theoretical
framework, a set of exemplary problems-and-solutions, puzzling phenomena awaiting
solution, instruments, standards for gauging whether puzzles have been solved, and
cognitive values for researchers to seek after.
Members of a scientific community of a particular scientific specialty have, as Kuhn sees
it, been similarly educated and have undergone much the same professional initiation
through higher degree research. They have studied the same specialist literature, drawing
similar conclusions from it, and have learnt a common language. The typical Kuhnian
scientific community is characterised by homogeneity, consensus and – scientific transac-
tions and communication occurring between, but seldom beyond, scientists of the same
community – well defined boundaries.
Kuhn envisages a paradigm as a programme for research of the kind that he describes
as ‘normal science’. The normality of this science consists in the fact that most scientists in
the theoretical sciences are engaged in paradigm-based research throughout their careers.
Historical examples of paradigms, as cited by Kuhn, centre on the theories of Copernicus,
Galileo, Newton, Lavoisier, Darwin, Maxwell and Einstein. Each of these paradigms,
Kuhn suggests, has a corresponding scientific community.
Research in a Kuhnian scientific community involves its members in seeking solutions
to ‘puzzles’ to which their paradigm has pointed, with certain predictive implications of the
paradigm being contradicted by the results of experiments. (Kuhn’s rendering of normal
science, emphasising the elaboration of knowledge rather than criticism of it, contrasts
with the falsificationist image of science that Karl Popper famously set out in his The Logic
of Scientific Discovery.) Availing themselves of the resources of the paradigm, researchers
apply their ingenuity to ironing out these difficulties.
Among the puzzles of a paradigm, Kuhn informs his readers, there are always some that
resist solution, and these recalcitrant puzzles come to be seen by ‘normal scientists’, not as
challenges that the combination of paradigm and experience poses to their puzzle-solving
prowess but, as likely defects – ‘anomalies’ – of the paradigm itself. Disenchantment on
the part of normal scientists with their paradigm may culminate in a ‘scientific revolution’
in which the paradigm is pushed aside in favour of another, the old scientific community
collapsing and a new one forming around the new paradigm. The new paradigm, as
described in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, may prove to be ‘incommensurable’ with
the old. Incommensurable paradigms are not contradictories; they are so utterly different
in their respective depictions of objects as to exclude the possibility of logical relations
existing between them. This being the case, there can be no progress in a scientific disci-
pline, in Kuhn’s view; no sequence of improving theoretical approximations to objective
truth as an ideal end.
Kuhn discloses a range of scientific communities in contemporary science. At the
highest level of generality is the global scientific community of all scientific researchers.
Geologists, physicists, botanists, etc. are recognised by Kuhn as forming scientific commu-
nities of professional groupings; solid-state physicists typify important subgroups as scientific
communities; with micro-groupings as the most exclusive of scientific communities, their
populations ranging from twenty up to a hundred members worldwide. Some scientists,
Kuhn suggests, may belong to more than one micro-community. It is principally in these
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micro-communities, Kuhn explains in later writing, that paradigms inhere, and in which
knowledge in science is produced and validated.
In Against Method and other writings that he published from the 1970s onwards, Paul
Feyerabend indirectly criticised Kuhn’s account of science as being practised in autono-
mous communities, each revolving around a paradigm. Feyerabend sees Kuhn’s account as
elitist in its justifying of the authority of science in modern society, an authority that serves,
so far as Feyerabend is concerned, to vitiate, and even to eliminate, other forms of life
and belief. Part of Feyerabend’s response to Kuhn, and to what he sees as the despotic
relationship that has developed between science and government in modern society, is to
argue for the subjection of scientific research to democratic control. Topics for scientific
research, in Feyerabend’s account, should be finally decided by interested and concerned
citizens. Feyerabend also objects to Kuhn’s view of each major programme of scientific
research as dominated by one paradigm. It would serve to diversify and to enrich science,
Feyerabend believes, were a monistic paradigm to be replaced with many theories which
could be fruitfully investigated. Feyerabend drew his inspiration from the theory of knowl-
edge that John Stuart Mill outlined in his classic contribution to liberal ideas, On Liberty
(1859).
Kuhn for his part indicated that his inclusion of the theme of scientific community in
his theory of science owed something to the Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen
Tatsache (1935) of Ludwik Fleck (1896–1961). Kuhn’s reference to Fleck’s neglected book
sparked sufficient interest to bring about its translation into English, in which it was
published under the title Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (1979).
LUDWIK FLECK: THOUGHT COLLECTIVES AND STYLES
A microbiologist practising in Lvov (then in Poland), Fleck devoted his Entstehung und
Entwicklung to studying changing conceptions of syphilis in history, exhibiting the extent
to which these conceptions differed from one another. At one level an extended historical
case study, at another level Fleck’s book presents a sociological theory of knowledge.
Two connected concepts stand out in his sociology of knowledge: ‘thought collective’ and
‘thought style’. The first term may well have been coined by Fleck; the second was possibly
a coinage of the sociologist of knowledge Karl Mannheim, who was using it by 1925. At
first sight, these concepts of Fleck’s appear to correspond to Kuhn’s concepts of scientific
community and paradigm, and it is quite conceivable that Kuhn generated his concepts
under Fleck’s influence. Fact is, however, that Fleck’s thought collective and Kuhn’s scien-
tific community are different concepts, as will be explained below. (Occasionally Fleck is
found using the term scientific community, but it is thought collective that is his primary
social term of analysis.)
According to Fleck, facts are not crystallisations of truth, being instead – as with other
forms of knowledge – ideas that are part of a thought style that agents acquire through
education. As ideas come into fashion and, at a later stage, lose their suasive power, so
it is with facts, explains Fleck. A Fleckian thought style is a complex that stipulates rules
of intellectual cooperation, assigns meanings to words, delineates problems, imposes stan-
dards, sanctions methods, and disposes agents to feel, act and express themselves in some
characteristic way. Each thought style is understood by Fleck to have its own distinctive
disposition or orienting ‘mood’.
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Perception, discovery and knowing, in Fleck’s account, are not individual-psychological
processes, but intensely social. They occur in the course of social interaction and are
forced on people by a thought style, argues Fleck. A thought style is natural to the point of
being unquestionable to the people who are enmeshed in it, and other thought styles they
dismiss as arbitrary and indefensible.
Fleck explains that a thought style is incorporated in, and sustained by, a corresponding
thought collective (sometimes described by Fleck as a ‘thought community’), which is a
social entity that has conscious individual agents as its members, without being reducible
to them. In each thought collective Fleck identifies an ‘esoteric’ and an ‘exoteric’ circle,
with most members of the collective belonging to the latter (the ‘masses’ as opposed to the
‘elite’).2 A thought collective forms around some specific creation of the mind (Denkgebilde)
which defines the character of the thought style. An individual agent may belong to several
exoteric circles, Fleck suggests, while belonging to few, if any, esoteric circles. The esoteric
circle of a thought collective consists in ‘initiates’ who are hierarchically ordered according
to the level of their expertise. The esoteric circle, making the Denkgebilde intelligible to
members of the exoteric, peripheral circle, has to be supported by the latter’s ‘public
opinion’ in order for it to be able to function. From one thought collective to the next, the
two circles differ as to their relative power.
Fleck’s theory is not exclusively one of scientific thought collectives (or scientific
communities). Besides being a more inclusive theory than is Kuhn’s, Fleck’s theory differs
in its conception of social structure, with its division of thought collectives into esoteric
and exoteric circles. Kuhn’s attention is firmly fixed on scientific communities, whereas
Fleck’s thought collectives include the extra-scientific no less than the scientific. In
modern society, Fleck identifies ‘professional and semiprofessional thought communities
[collectives] in commerce, the military, sports, art, politics, fashion, science, and religion’
among others.3
Fleck’s book discusses illustrative examples of thought collectives and thought styles
in modern science. In the science of radioactivity, for example, Fleck locates the radium
specialist in the centre of the esoteric circle, surrounded by physicists as experts of a
general kind, with the exoteric circle consisting in educated amateurs. The esoteric circle
of this, or any other, scientific thought collective practises what Fleck describes as ‘expert
science’, of which he distinguishes ‘journal’ and ‘vademecum’ forms. Expert science
is contrasted by Fleck with ‘popular’ science, that is science as interpreted by the non-
expert. Vividly presented and simplified, popular science contributes to the worldview
(Weltanschauung) that is accepted in the wider society, and the worldview is in turn the
context, and a source of general features, of the thought style of the scientific specialist.
Esoteric knowledge permeates through exoteric knowledge. An example of exoteric
knowledge, as cited by Fleck, consists in pathologists diagnosing a throat swab, describing
the essentials of the results in terms that are intelligible to exoteric general practitioners.
Proceeding ‘to the large circle of the “generally educated,”’ Fleck explains, ‘knowledge
becomes pellucid and facile; at the same time, thought-constrained proofs disappear:
it becomes even more apodictic. The mother of the child whose throat swab had been
examined is simply informed: “Your child has diphtheria.”’4
Expert science in its journal form involves the creative expert, working at the inter-
section of thought collectives, drawing from different lines of thought to produce new
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ideas. The expert scientist’s reports of his creative achievements make up Fleckian journal
science. Journal science is, we learn from Fleck, personal and disjointed. Vademecum
science Fleck depicts as science in its synoptical handbook, as against its textbook, form,
having systematic arrangement of scientific knowledge as its object. Fleck compares
‘a vademecum’, constructed from ‘individual contributions’ and carefully ordered, to the
creation of ‘a mosaic from many coloured stones’. Devised according to a ‘plan’, Fleck’s
vademecum imposes ‘guidelines for future research’.5
As indicated above, Fleck’s concept of thought collective is not identical to Kuhn’s
concept of scientific community, Fleck’s being the more inclusive. While appreciative that
Fleck was a, and perhaps the, source of his sociological perspective on science, Kuhn, in
the ‘Foreword’ that he wrote for the English translation of Fleck’s book, indicates that
there are strands in Fleck’s thought on which he looked unfavourably. Kuhn particularly
disapproved of Fleck’s tendency to characterise the thought collective as if it were a single
mind, possessing a will, power, tenacity and the like.
CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, JOSIAH ROYCE
There are passages in the writings of Peirce (1839–1914), the American thinker who made
noteworthy contributions to logic, philosophy and several scientific disciplines, suggesting
that he believed that scientific inquiry occurs in a community. (He probably also believed
that certain inquiries outside of science are communal.) It would appear, however, that
Peirce did not use the term ‘scientific community’.
As affirmed by Peirce’s semiotic theory, human thinking is conducted through the
medium of signs/symbols, and the properties of the things that exist for us depend upon
the signs that are in use for referring to them. The sign relation is conceived by Peirce
as ‘triadic’, a sign consisting in any ‘thought or interpretation’ that ‘stands for [represents]
something [its object] to’ the interpreter (‘interpretant’) of the relation.6 Peirce’s interpreter
can only attain to knowledge of an object by means of a sign representing the object.
In relying on symbols, Peirce argues, the agent participates in a ‘linguistic community’,
symbols being incorporated in communally accepted ‘conventions’. Cognition Peirce takes
to be communal for a further reason: people being influenced by one another’s opinions
indicates ‘that the problem becomes how to fix belief, not in the individual merely, but
in the community’.7 An agent is, for Peirce, prompted to engage in inquiry by the vexation
of doubt, struggling to achieve a firm belief. The object of inquiry is, on this view, to so fix
belief that it will habituate our conduct in ways that will enable us to achieve our aims.
With Descartes as his foil, Peirce argues that the truth of beliefs is not decidable by the
conviction of individuals nor by their use of a method of systematic doubt. Peirce regards
the aim of scientists’ inquiries as one of true belief – representing objects that are real –
which belief scientists can only settle by way of agreement among themselves. ‘The real’,
writes Peirce, ‘is that which . . . information and reasoning would finally result in, and
which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very origin of
the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a
COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of an indefinite increase of knowl-
edge.’8 According to Peirce, agreement among scientists as to which beliefs are true,
and what objects real, is reached by way of their use of the scientific method of fixing
belief. In Peirce’s understanding, this method is not a product of philosophers’ analyses
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nor of their logical prescriptions, but emerges in scientific research itself. To his belief that
there are real objects, existing externally to, and independent of, our minds, with our
minds being adapted to the world as a result of natural selection, Peirce adds the assump-
tion that the effect of real objects on the sensations of members of the community of
scientific inquirers is such that it will eventually help to bring about the convergence of their
beliefs.
Royce (1855–1916), the idealist philosopher who was at Harvard University for most of
his academic career, presented community as a major theme in his The Philosophy of Loyalty
(1908) and in several of his other later writings, probably having borrowed the concept
from the writings of Peirce. In The Problem of Christianity (1913), Royce refers to Peirce’s
theory of interpretation, and he also makes mention of a view that had recently been
expressed by Charles S. Minot, Professor of Comparative Anatomy at Harvard. According
to Minot, while owing its discoveries to individuals, science requires that candidates for
the status of discoveries be validated by passing tests of confirmation and correlation that
other scientists impose on them. This two stage process that Minot sees as occurring in
science is described by him as the personal followed by the ‘depersonalising’. Royce agrees
with the substance of Minot’s account, but Minot’s saying that the discoveries of indi-
vidual scientists come to be divested of ‘their personal character’ strikes Royce as less than
felicitous. Royce prefers to describe this fact (‘this well-known maxim of method’) in terms
of the discoveries of individual scientists having ‘to be interpreted to the scientific community,
and then substantiated by the further experience of that community, before they belong
to the science’.9 In the first – discovery – stage, Royce explains, a scientist produces a
hypothesis to answer a conceptual question. Empirically verifying his hypothesis, the sci-
entist has putatively discovered a fact of experience; the idea of which he has conceived
appears to ‘work’ in experience, with ‘concept’ and ‘percept’ complementing each other.
Supported by the findings of the individual, the hypothesis is, as Royce sees it, passed on
to the scientific community whose members, displaying their characteristic ‘team-work’,
apply themselves to empirically validating (or disconfirming) the hypothesis.
Royce envisages the scientific community as a ‘Community of Interpretation’, to which
scientists are imbued with a spirit of loyalty.10 In a Community of Interpretation, Royce
indicates, a Peircean process of triadic interpretation is in motion. It is a Community of
participants who are engaged in the process of knowing. The unity of the Community
consists in its members variously occupying different roles: the agent who interprets
the thoughts of one mind to another respectively being the Interpreter, Interpreted and
Interpretant. As a variation on this Peircean theme of the triad, Royce proposes that
the belief in an object as a common object of experience is, for all the believers involved,
an ‘interpretation’. I perceive an object. That another person perceives the same object is,
explains Royce, something that I have to assume (an interpretation), and so on for each
person, this principle of interpretation being fundamental to the functioning of science,
and to our entire social existence.
Royce offers a further reason as to why science cannot be practised other than in
a scientific community. In science, as in disciplines such as law and medicine, it is an
established principle that individuals are less than impartial and objective when their
own beliefs and interests are involved. It is for this reason that the scientist claiming
to have made a discovery is, in Royce’s words, ‘subject to Professor Minot’s maxim’ of
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community validation. ‘Isolated observations of individuals . . . are always unsatisfactory’,
the accredited facts of physical science having to be assented to communally.11
A presupposition of each scientific investigation, the scientific community is analysed by
Royce into the discoverer, the interpreter of the discovery who describes and reports on it,
and critical scientists who find further empirical evidence with which to test the putative
discovery. Royce goes on to write about the human ‘will to interpret’ that exists in scien-
tific, religious, philosophical and other enterprises. Science successfully embodies the will
in a ‘community of interpretation’, in marked contrast to a discipline such as philosophy
which is characterised by disagreement, not unity. The scientific community has the goal
of true knowledge of the natural world, the community being sustained by its members
remaining loyal to this cause. The virtue of loyalty being honoured, Royce describes the
scientific community, and other genuine communities of interpretation, as resembling ‘the
ideal Pauline Church’. ‘For there’, Royce observes, ‘is the member whose office it is to
edify. There is the brother who is to be edified. And there is the spirit of the community,
who is in one aspect the interpreter, and in another aspect the being who is interpreted.’12
Royce may well have been the first thinker to use the term ‘scientific community’, and
he has been credited with having developed a theory of scientific community that is
‘robust’ on account of its recognition of loyalty as the paramount virtue of community
life. Royce’s depiction of what the scientific community consists in is, nevertheless, too
abstract for it to be able to properly illuminate the subject. Royce paints no detailed picture
of the structure, authority and activities that characterise the scientific community.
MICHAEL POLANYI
The contribution of the polymathic Polanyi (1891–1976) – successively and successfully
medical practitioner, researcher in physical chemistry, and philosopher – to the under-
standing of the present topic consists in his having been the first theorist to describe
directly and in detail the nature of the ‘scientific community’ under that express
designation. Polanyi first used the label ‘scientific community’ in the script of a lecture –
‘Self-government of science’ – that he gave in 1942.13 (The text appeared in published
form in Polanyi’s 1951 essay collection The Logic of Liberty.) A year earlier Polanyi had used
the expression ‘community of specialists’ to refer collectively to scientific researchers,
applying the same name to other groups of creative cultural workers. In his paper of
1942, Polanyi contrasted autonomous science against science that is government-directed.
Making a case for autonomous, self-regulating science, Polanyi simultaneously argued
against British scientists – J. D. Bernal, Lancelot Hogben and J. G. Crowther being three
of the leading lights – who, influenced by Soviet ideology and by Soviet state planning
and dirigiste social engineering, rejected the possibility of basic science, and enjoined that
scientists’ research projects be decided and coordinated by government ministers and
public servants with the objective of advancing human wellbeing.
Insisting on the importance of pure science, and denying that it can be centrally
planned, Polanyi proceeded to explain its nature. He indicated that pure scientists, pro-
vided with material resources for conducting research, are permitted considerable freedom
for the purposes of deciding what in their view are the topics that are presently most
promising of discoveries. Scientists’ decisions about the field in which to conduct their
investigation, the problem with which to wrestle, where the solution-discovery is most
likely to lie, are all, Polanyi insists, highly personal. (Polanyi’s most important book has the
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title Personal Knowledge (1958).) These are complex judgements that emerge from the skilled
processing of intuitions, insights, clues, interpretations, observations, ideas, experimental
results and the like. Of many of these ingredients of their personal judgements Polanyi’s
scientists have only limited awareness, and they would find them impossible to clearly
describe. Unexpressed and perhaps inexpressible, these elements form what Polanyi distin-
guishes as ‘tacit knowledge’. The decision-making of scientists is not a hit or miss affair,
but involves, for Polanyi, a high level of expertise, being embedded in training, experience,
reflection and analysis. No politician or public servant, in Polanyi’s view, is capable of
taking the personal decisions that are essential to scientific research. The tacit knowledge
involved cannot be transferred from the pure scientific researcher to government planners.
Polanyi introduces the expression ‘scientific community’ in the following passage: ‘The
scientist today cannot practise his calling in isolation. He must occupy a definite position
within a framework of institutions. A chemist becomes a member of the chemical
profession; a zoologist, a mathematician or a psychologist – each belongs to a particular
group of specialized scientist [sic]. The different groups of scientists together form the
scientific community.’14 The freedom of the individual scientist is counterbalanced by what
Polanyi describes as the ‘opinion’ that scientists collectively express. The members of the
Polanyian scientific community are not without differences of authority and influence.
Scientists with major discoveries to their credit are primus inter pares in the community,
having the major effect on decision-making, with Polanyi distinguishing them as the
community’s ‘chief influentials’. Advising on the distribution of grant money, award of
honours, appointment to professorial chairs, these unofficial rulers affect the lines of
scientific investigation as they see fit. The ‘influentials’ decide whether investigation in
specific areas will be initiated or stopped, stimulated or slowed. Guided by the ‘standards
of value’ of scientific knowledge (inherent interest, depth, precision), scientists of influence
rationally allocate funds and facilities.15
The opinion of the scientific community, expressed in the judgements of influentials –
the scientific elite – and of other scientists who are affected by the views of the influentials,
decides which fields are presently the more promising of significant discoveries. There will
be an increase in the number of PhD candidates being trained for research in these areas.
Papers describing results of research conducted in these areas will be favoured for publi-
cation ahead of papers from relatively stagnant fields of investigation. Communal opinion
on these matters changes over time, as do scientific method-rules of discovery, and the
standards on which scientists base their judgements about whether the quality of reported
discoveries and their evidential support is such as to warrant the publication of submitted
papers.
The methods of scientific discovery and the standards of value are, for Polanyi,
constitutive elements of the ‘tradition of practice’ of the scientific community. Much of
this tradition consists in knowledge of the tacit kind noted above, being embodied in the
activities of researchers. The tradition of knowledge of the methods and the standards of
scientific research is transmitted, Polanyi explains, as PhD students observe the practice of
the master to whom they are indentured, striving to emulate the master’s skilled technique,
being sensitive to his manipulations, his discriminations and selections.
As Kuhn knew his Polanyi, the possibility cannot be ruled out that he borrowed the
expression ‘scientific community’ from Polanyi and was influenced in his depiction of the
scientific community by Polanyi’s account of it.
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COMPARISON
The accounts of Peirce and Royce are too abstract to permit of their being meaningfully
compared with the theories of Polanyi, Kuhn and Fleck. Between these three latter
theories, however, one finds interesting similarities and differences.
It has been argued by Gary Gutting that a paramount concern to Kuhn in The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions is the authority of science. But this interpretation is open to question
because Kuhn is uninformative in Structure on whether particular scientists in his scientific
communities have authority. If certain scientists have authority, which scientists are they,
how do they come by it, and how do they exercise it? Kuhn is mute on this topic of
rulership of scientific communities. Kuhn assumes that consensus arises as a matter of
course in a normal scientific community, but he sheds little light on the mechanics by
which this consensus is achieved, maintained and enforced. It is not inaccurate to say
that Kuhn’s scientific community has no political dimension. In this respect, the Kuhnian
scientific community is in marked contrast to the Polanyian. Polanyi’s scientific commu-
nity has a clear political dimension, being ruled by scientific opinion and, in particular, by
‘influentials’.
The theories of Kuhn and Fleck are similar in respect of their claiming that the social
entities they each affirm depend for their existence and identity on corresponding cultural
objects: paradigms as described by Kuhn and thought styles by Fleck. The acquisition of,
and adherence to, these cultural complexes is the source of the social consensus of Kuhn’s
scientific communities and of Fleck’s collectives. The scientific community of Polanyi
derives its unity from its tradition of practice, and from the authority of its ‘influentials’
that diffuses through the consensual scientific opinion, being expressed in the decisions
of journal editors and referees, and the decisions of members of funding agencies and
selection committees.
Notwithstanding the similarities between Kuhn’s theory and that of Fleck, Kuhn is
critical of some of what Fleck writes. Kuhn finds in Fleck a sociology of the ‘collective
mind’, which is a perspective that is offputting to Kuhn.16 One strand in Fleck’s writing,
Kuhn argues, hypostatises thought collectives, illogically taking the name to stand for a real
object with a unity of its own. Kuhn also complains that in his reading of Fleck’s text,
agents are possessed of what are in effect inborn Kantian categories of thought, as an
indispensable condition of these agents being able to think and to achieve knowledge.
This is, Kuhn says, an a priori theory, contradicting Fleck’s stated aim of producing an
empirically-based sociology of knowledge.
We have noted that in the scientific community as depicted by Polanyi, individual agents
are allowed considerable latitude for the purposes of selecting their problems for research
and for deciding on how and where to seek discoveries with which to solve the problems.
Polanyi in a later writing described the scientific community as the ‘republic of science’,
underlining its autonomy and self-government as protective of the freedoms of its citizens.
Fleck and Kuhn, on the other hand, depict social groupings whose members are severely
constrained by substantive orthodoxy and by the conventions of method. Indicatively,
Kuhn never once uses the word ‘freedom’ in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
Polanyi affirms the existence of one scientific community only, comprising all research
scientists. In Polanyi’s global scientific community there are subgroups of ‘specialized
scientist’ (zoologists, botanists, physicists, chemists, mathematicians, psychologists, among
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others), which are comprised of ‘research schools’. For Kuhn, there are many scientific
communities, ranging, as we noted earlier, from micro-scientific communities, with per-
haps a score or two of members, through subgroups and professional groups, up to the
global community of all scientific researchers. They are all equally described as scientific
communities by Kuhn.
It has been pointed out by Margaret Masterman that Kuhn lost control of the term
‘paradigm’ as he wrote The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, applying it to all manner of things,
voiding the term of definite meaning.17 This produced no end of confusion in the minds
of his readers. The very different sorts of social formations that Kuhn describes as scien-
tific communities means that ‘scientific community’ suffers from similar problems in his
writing. Fleck’s use of ‘thought collective’ is even more indiscriminate than is Kuhn’s of
‘scientific community’. Fleck’s thought collectives are not exclusive to science; they arise in
all subject areas and in everyday social discourse. Some thought collectives may possess
stability, continuing in existence for some time. Most thought collectives are, however,
Fleck suggests, only transient. Fleck writes that thought collectives form ‘wherever two or
more people are actually exchanging thoughts’. Should ‘a third person join . . . in, a new
collective arises. The previous mood will dissolve and with it the special creative force of
the former small collective.’18 By this standard, flying in the face of Occam’s razor, Fleck’s
class of thought collectives includes virtually every formation in social life. Fleck adds to
the complexity of his analysis by saying that each person can belong to several thought
collectives.
Kuhn became alert to the problem concerning scientific communities. He came to see
that to apply ‘scientific community’ to disparate social formations is to vitiate the idea and
the expression as a descriptive tool. He specified in a later work that the principal form of
scientific community is the small grouping that is most intimately involved in research, the
small community with, as a rule, a mere two or three dozen members.
It is one thing to affirm the existence of scientific communities, and another matter
to establish empirically that they exist. Kuhn was sensitive to the need for empirical
confirmation of the existence of micro-scientific communities. The main method he
advocated for turning the intuitive concept of scientific community into an empirical one
consisted in recording the citations or references that appear in scientific papers. Citations,
explains Kuhn, indicate with whom scientists communicate most frequently. A concen-
tration of communication would, in Kuhn’s view, empirically support the existence of a
micro-scientific community. This, however, was not work that Kuhn ever undertook.
After Kuhn had made a theme of ‘scientific community’ in The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, ‘the rest’, as the saying goes, ‘is history’. The term was taken up with enthusi-
asm by historians, philosophers and sociologists of science, and before long it had become
entrenched as the dominant view of the social nature of science. Since the 1960s, with the
exception of a Feyerabend or a Karen Knorr Cetina (see her The Manufacture of Knowledge),
very few scholars have questioned the notion that science is practised in communities, and
even fewer have offered alternatives to the scientific community perspective.
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